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What Happens When Parties Fail
to Prove Foreign Law?
by William L. Reynolds•
I.

INTRODUCTION

The first discussion in this excellent and provoking Symposium
concerns the effect of a party's failure to prove the content of foreign law.
That discussion epitomizes much of what is wrong in academic thought
about choice of law today.
The Symposium colloquy focused on Walton v. Arabian American Oil
Co. 1 The issue in that case was whether an employer could be held
liable under respondeat superior for an automobile accident in Saudi
Arabia. Neither side offered or attempted to prove the content of Saudi
law. Plaintiff instead obstinately rested his case on New York law. 2
The trial judge, however, refused to take judicial notice of Saudi law and
directed a verdict for defendant. 3 The Second Circuit affirmed. 4
That decision would be inexplicable if rendered today. It ignores the
language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1. Worse, it ignores
litigation realities and common practice. There is no constitutional or
practical objection to the application of New York law to the Walton
plaintiff's case. Accordingly, the enthusiasm shown by several of the
Symposium participants for the result in Walton can only be explained
by the over-fondness for conceptualization that I believe mars contemporary academic discussion of choice of law.

* Jacob A. France Professor of Judicial Process, University of Maryland School of Law.
Dartmouth College (A.B., 1967); Harvard Law School (J.D., 1970).
1. 233 F.2d 641 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 872 (1966).
2. 233 F.2d at 642.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 646.
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II. THE BLACK LETTER
The clear language of Rule 44.1, if it had been in force at the time that
Walton was decided, should have led to a different result. Rule 44.1
provides: "A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of
a foreign country shall give notice ...."5 The implication for Walton is
ineluctable. Plaintiff did not wish to raise an issue concerning foreign
law; he was content to rest on forum (New York) law. 6 In that situation, the language of Rule 44.1 squarely puts the burden on the
defendant to allege and produce foreign law. Because it failed to allege,
much less prove, foreign (Saudi) law, plaintiff should have been
permitted to proceed with his case under forum law.
III. A LITIGATION REALITY CHECK
That result makes perfect sense. Many legal problems have contacts
with more than one jurisdiction, sometimes with three or more-a
common enough occurrence around New York City or Washington, D.C.,
for example. If the holding of Walton, and the enthusiasm of the
participants means anything, it is that any nontrivial contact between
a foreign state and the dispute will require briefing of the applicability
vel non of foreign law. Forum law, therefore, is not raised at the peril
of dismissal. That peril is all the more extreme given the modern
enthusiasm for deper;age-the notion that each issue in a case might be
controlled by the law of a different state.
That result makes no sense. Researching foreign law, especially that
of other nations, is expensive. Writing choice-of-law memoranda is even
more expensive; the law, as well as the theory, is unbelievably abstract
and indeterminate. Expensive, and otherwise irrelevant discovery might
be necessary to provide support for a choice-of-law assertion.
In those circumstances, it is easy to understand why the parties often
do not seek to prove foreign law. It is far more practical for the plaintiff
in Walton, for example, to rely on New York law and not get involved in
the exceedingly complicated and expensive business of proving the Saudi
law of respondeat superior. 7 It is only unless and until the defendant

5. FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1. Section 4.01 of the Uniform Interstate and International
Procedure Act, 13 U.L.A. 355, 394 (1962), contains similar language.
6. 233 F.2d at 542.
7. Expert testimony on the subject might not be enough.. Ironically, Judge Frank, who
wrote the opinion in Walton, also wrote a notorious opinion rejecting expert testimony
concerning Argentine admiralty law. See Usatorre v. The Victoria, 172 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.
1949).
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raises the issue of foreign law that the plaintiff will begin worrying
about the problem of foreign law.
But the defendant also may choose not to raise the issue. Perhaps the
omission is due to incompetence. It also may be that foreign law is
uncertain, and argument over it would distract from an otherwise strong
case. More likely, the omission is due to financial reality: the defendant
probably has given its counsel a limited budget, and esoteric forays into
the Saudi law of respondeat superior would not fall within that budget,
unless the case involves a lot of money and it looks as if Saudi law might
be controlling. 8 In many cases, therefore, neither the defendant nor the
plaintiff will have any incentive to raise a possibly controlling issue of
foreign law-even if they recognize its existence. And, of course, as the
controlling aspect of foreign law recedes, there is even less incentive to
spend time and money on it.
In short, the black letter of Rule 44.1, as well as litigation practicality,
compel the conclusion that the decision in Walton was wrong. That still
leaves the possibility, however, that either the Constitution or some
inherent interest of individual states should lead to a different result.
Neither does.
IV.

OF CIRCLES AND INTERESTS

Supporters of Walton often argue that plaintiff's claim must fail
because he had not established a cause of action under controlling law;
that is, he failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. That
argument is easily disposed of, for it is inherently circular-it assumes
that New York law, the law upon which he premised his case, cannot
provide him with a remedy. That decision, however, requires a
determination that New York law does not control, an issue which had
not been briefed, or apparently even raised by defendant.
More plausible is the argument that the foreign state (Saudi Arabia
in Walton) has "interests" that cannot be waived by the parties' inaction.
Hence, a failure to raise the Saudi law of respondeat superior prevents

8. One of the many curious aspects of Walton is the assumption by everyone-judges
and scholars alike-that Saudi law controls the respondeat superior question. It certainly
is plausible enough that the law of New York would control; the employment may have had
a New York center, and the stay in Saudi Arabia of the employee may have been purely
temporary. Unfortunately, the opinion contains no information about the employeremployee relation.
Both the court and commentators apparently believe that all issues in Walton were
controlled by the First Restatement principle of lex loci delicti; hence, Saudi law controls
the question of vicarious liability. That would not necessarily be true, of course, under
modern forms of choice oflaw analysis.
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judicial recognition of the Saudi interest in that law. A vast amount of
literature examines this question of whether state law really advances
state interests rather than merely providing a rule of decision.
Reviewing that question is far beyond the scope of this brief Essay; I ·
shall limit myself to the observation that it seems most improbable that
any nation's co:r;tcept of agency law has· anything to do with the interests
of that country.
The implausibility of that argument is easy to demonstrate. Consider
the implication~ of taking seriously the state interests argument in
variations on Walton. State interests are sacrificed constantly by
litigants. Could the parties, for example, settle the case before filing, or
before trial, without reference to Saudi law? If the answer is yes, what
becomes of the Saudi interest? How does one distinguish Walton from
those hypotheticals?
Even more telling is the possibility that the employment contract
stipulated that it would be controlled by the law of New York. Such
clauses are routinely enforced under section 187 of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts. 9 Enforcement of New York law would be permissible, even if the relation had no contacts with New York, because
presumably, New York law provides a developed body of precedent while
Saudi law does not.
Far more important is the practical point: Litigants are very poor
proxies for a state attorney general. That should be patently obvious to
anyone who has ever practiced law. My job as counsel is to secure for
my client a favorable resolution of a dispute. Unless I represent a
frequent institutional litigant, I am indifferent as to whether that
resolution advances the interests of any state. I certainly have no
business as counsel in raising interests of other states that may interfere
with my client's chances of success.
V. THE CONSTITUTION
Finally, it is quite possible to argue that any choice of forum law is
constitutionally permissible; that, after all, was the traditional view. As
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman 10 teaches, the traditional view is entitled to
some constitutional deference. Even if that is not true, however, it is
difficult to see a serious constitutional objection to application of forum
law as a default rule. Routine judicial approval of contracts and
settlements ignoring foreign law show how little weight courts give to
constitutional concerns in the area.

9.
10.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 187 (1996).
486
717 (1988).

u.s.
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Finally, the Walton rule may be abused easily. It is inconceivable that
a court would require proof of foreign law in every case when it might
be controlling. Necessarily, it would be raised sua sponte only in a very
small number of cases. This is especially true when the choice-of-law
issue is raised by a court for the first time on appeal. That raises the
questions of accountability and predictability. Whenever a court decides
a case on the basis of a rule rarely invoked, but frequently available,
there is a strong suspicion that the court is responding to a hidden
agenda. That, of course, would be impermissible.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is bad enough that much of academic writing on choice of law is so
esoteric that it borders on irrelevancy. _It is far worse that judges,
unfamiliar with choice of law cases largely due to their relative scarcity,
will be misled by that writing into unjust decisions. Choice-of-law cases
are difficult ~nough; they should not be made impossible by ignoring the
reality of litigation. Let the parties try their own case.
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